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For the reasons above stated, I cannot concur in the philosophy, the reasoning, or the law of the majority opinion. The
judgment should be reversed.
Carter, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 24930. In Bank.

Sept. 19, 1958.]

PEARL ANNA KOLLERT et al., Appellants, v. ALBERT
FRANKLIN CUNDIFF et al., Respondents.
[1] Automobiles-Findings and Verdict.-In an action for injuries
arising out of a collision of vehicles at an intersection, findings
against four children riding in the back seat of plaintiffs' car
could be explained on the theory that they had not proved any
substantial injuries caused by the accident where, with respect
to three of the children, it was clear that the jury was not
required to find under the evidence that they had been injured,
and where, with respect to the other, concerning whom a doctor
testified that a week after the accident he found a slight
fracture in a finger, defendants presented evidence that X-rays
taken after the accident showed no fracture, and the doctor
on cross-examination acknowledged that the fracture might
have been sustained after the accident.
[2] !d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-In an action
for injuries arising out of a collision of vehicles at an intersection, where the evidence would support a finding that both
defendant driver and plaintiff driver were negligent and the
jury might have believed that plaintiff's mother, who was riding in the car, was chargeable with plaintiff's negligence or
that she in some degree failed to exercise due care for her own
safety, and where erroneous instructions on contributory
negligence of plaintiff's mother (defendants did not plead that
she was guilty of contributory negligence), when considered
with the evidence, might have improperly caused the jury to
go beyond the issues pleaded and return the verdict against
plaintiff's mother on the ground of contributory negligence,
the erroneous instructions required that the judgment against
plaintiff's mother be reversed.
[3] New Trial-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-Generally, affidavits of jurors may not be used to impeach a verdict.
[3) See Cal.Jur.2d, New Trial, § 43 et seq.; Am.Jur., New Trial,
§ 198.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 356; [2) Automobiles,
§ 385-14; [3, 5, 6) New Trial, § 169(1); [4] New Trial, §§ 169(1),
169(4).
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[4a, 4b] !d.-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-Only
tions to the general rule that affidavits of
used to impeach a verdict are recognized: one, to
the verdict was arrived at by chance (Code Civ. Proc., § 657,
subd. 2) ; the other, that bias or disqualification of a juror
was concealed by false answers on voir dire.
[5] !d.-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-Code Civ. Proc., § 657,
subd. 1, providing that a verdict may be vacated for "irregularity in the proceedings," does not refer to
affidavits
and may not be regarded as permitting the use of such affidavits in situations where they would not otherwise be proper.
(Disapproving contrary statements in Shipley v. Permanente
Hospital, 127 Cal.App.2d 417, 424 [274 P.2d 53].)
[6] !d.-Affidavits-Misconduct of Jury.-In an action for injuries
arising out of a collision of vehicles at an intersection, affidavits of jurors that the bailiff, on being told that the vote
against one plaintiff was nine to three, advised the jury that
there would be no need for further instructions since a verdict
had been reached, that the foreman, over the protests of some
jurors, completed the verdicts as to the remaining plaintiffs
without further deliberation, and that the foreman, during a
night recess, investigated traffic lights at the intersection where
the accident occurred and made a report, which was considered
by the jury, could not be used to impeach the verdict.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Fred Miller, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Action for damages for personal ll1Juries ar1smg out of a
collision of automobiles at an intersection. Judgment for defendants against plaintiff Gertrude C. Abrahamson, reversed;
affirmed in all other respects.
Robert H. Lund and Floyd H. King for Appellants.
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and J. H. Peckham for
Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment
for defendants, contending that the court erred in instructing
the jury and iu refusing to consider affidavits of jurors offered in support of a motion for new trial to prove misconduct
of the jury.
The plaintiffs, Mrs. Kollert, Mrs. Abrahamson, and four
children, were riding in a car which Mrs. Kollert was driving
50 C.2d-25
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when it collided with one operated by defendant Cundiff who
was then acting in the course of his employment by defendant
The Termo Company. Mrs. Abrahamson, who is Mrs. Kollert's
mother, was riding in the front seat with her. Four children,
Steven and Michael Kollert and Mary and Marlene Cleveland,
were riding in the back seat of the car.
The accident occurred in Long Beach at the intersection of
Carson Avenue and Paramount Boulevard, where traffic is
controlled by electrically operated signals. Mrs. Kollert was
driving west on Carson in the lane nearest the center line, and,
as she approached the intersection, there was no car in front
of her in that lane. She testified that the signal light on
Carson turned from red to green when she was half a block
from the intersection, that she was driving about 20 miles an
hour and that she did not see defendant's car until the collision occurred. A man who had been driving about 300 feet
behind Mrs. Kollert in the lane to her right testified that the
light was green when she entered the intersection and that
it was still green when the accident happened.
Cundiff was driving east on Carson, intending to make
a left turn north into Paramount. He testified that the light
was green as he came to the intersection and that he stopped
even with the curb. He signaled for a left turn, moved into
the intersection and waited for several westbound cars to
pass. As the light changed to amber, he drove across the
double line and saw the car driven by Mrs. Kollert, which
was then approximately 50 feet east of the intersection, traveling at about 35 miles per hour. The cars came together in
the westbound lane nearest the center line, the right front
part of Mrs. Kollert 's car colliding with the right front
wheel of Cundiff's car.
A witness who was driving the third car behind Cundiff
and in the same lane testified that traffic at the intersection
had stopped and that as the cars in the lane to the right began
to move, Cundiff, starting out very fast, turned left into the
intersection. The witness said that he noticed Mrs. Kollert 's
car coming toward Cundiff ''at a good rate of speed,'' as
soon as Cundiff started to move.
There was substantial evidence to support the implied finding of the jury either that Cundiff was not negligent or that
Mrs. Kollert was guilty of contributory negligence. However, in considering whether errors, if any, had a prejudicial
effect, it should be noted that, on both of these issues, the
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evidence would also have warranted a finding against defendants.1
The court gave instructions which submitted the issue of
contributory negligence to the jury not only as to Mrs. Kollert
but also as to Mrs. Abrahamson. Defendants did not plead
that Mrs. Abrahamson was guilty of contributory negligence,
and they concede that the instructions were erroneous as to
her but take the position that the error was not prejudicial.
[1] Defendants point out that the jury found against the
four children in the car, although it was instructed that the
defense of contributory negligence did not apply to them, and
they argue that the jury must have based its verdict for
Cundiff on a conclusion that he was not negligent. The findings against the children could be explained upon the theory
that they had not proved any substantial injuries caused by
the accident. With respect to three of the children it is clear
that the jury was not required to find under the evidence that
they had been injured, and it may be noted that defendants
moved for a directed verdict as to them on this ground.
However, defendants assert that it was conclusively established that the other minor plaintiff had received a fractured
finger as a result of the accident. We do not agree that
this is so. Although a doctor testified that a week after the
accident he found a slight fracture, defendants presented
evidence that X-rays taken at a hospital immediately after
the accident showed no fracture, and, on cross-examination by
defendants, the doctor acknowledged that the fracture might
have been sustained at some time after the accident. Thus
the jury may have concluded that the minor plaintiffs received
no substantial injuries and may have found against them on
that ground.
[2] As we have seen, the evidence would support a finding
that both Cundiff and Mrs. Kollert were negligent. The jury
may have believed that Mrs. Abrahamson was chargeable with
Mrs. Kollert 's negligence or that she in some degree failed
'At the time of the accident, July 1955, section 551 of the Vehicle
Code provided:
"(a) 'fhe driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn
to the left shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from
the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto
as to constitute an immediate hazard.
" (b) Said driver turning left having so yielded and having given a
signal when and as required by this code may make such left turn and
the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection from said
opposite direction shall yield the right of way to the driver making the
left turn.''
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to exercise due care for her own safety, and the erroneous
instructions, when considered with the evidence, may have
improperly caused the jury to go beyond the issues pleaded
and return the verdict against Mrs. Abrahamson on the ground
of contributory negligence. In these circumstances we are of
the view that the erroneous instructions require that the judgment against Mrs. Abrahamson be reversed.
When the jurors were polled, they stood nine to three in
favor of defendants. In support of the motion for a new trial,
affidavits of the three dissenting jurors and of one majority
juror were offered. The affidavits may be summarized as follovvs: 'I'he jury, taking four polls, considered the case of Mrs.
Kollert only, and by a poll of nine to three found that both
drivers were negligent and that Mrs. Kollert should be denied
recovery. The bailiff was summoned for the purpose of securing additional instructions as to the remaining plaintiffs. He
asked how the deliberations stood, and the foreman answered
that the vote was nine to three. The bailiff then left, returned,
and advised that there would be no need for further instructions since a verdict had been reached. Over the protest of
some jurors the foreman completed the verdicts as to the
remaining five plaintiffs without any further deliberation.
Two of the affidavits stated that the foreman told the jurors
that they would have to abide by the verdicts completed by
him or they would never again be allowed to act as jurors.
According to three affidavits, the foreman, during a night
recess, had investigated the traffic lights at the intersection
where the accident occurred, and his report on the periods
of the signals was considered by the jury.
[3] It is the general rule in California that affidavits of
jurors may not be used to impeach a verdict. (See People v.
Sutic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 495 [261 P.2d 241] (coercion of a juror
by the others to subscribe to a verdict]; People v. Evans, 39
Cal.2d 242, 250 [ 246 P .2d 636) (evidence received out of
court]; People v. Gidney, 10 Cal.2d 138, 146, 147 [73 P.2d
1186] [bailiff discussed case and probable sentence with
jurors]; People v. Azoff, 105 Cal. 632 (39 P. 59] [evidence.
received out of court); People v. Zelver, 135 Cal.App.2d 226,
235-236 [287 P.2d 183] [juror "coerced" and "intimidated"·
by other jurors]; Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal.App.2d 292, 295
( 117 P .2d 948] (independent investigation by some jurors] ;
People v. Giminiani, 45 Cal.App.2d 535, 539 [114 P.2d 392]
[jury informed by bailiff that a defendant had a bad reputation with the police].)
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statute
[ 4a] An exception to the general rule is made
where "any one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or spce.ial verdict . . . by a resort to the
determination of chanee . . . . " (Code Civ. Proe., § 657,
subd. 2. 2 ) Another exception, recognized by judic.iai decision,
is that affidavits of jurors may be used to set aside a verdict
where the bias or disqualification of a juror was concealed by
false answers on voir dire. (E.g., 1Y·illiams v. Bridges, 140
Cal.App. 537 [35 P.2d 407].)
[5] Subdivision 1 of section 657, which provides that a
verdict may be vacated for ''irregularity in the proceedings,''
does not refer to jurors' affidavits and may not be regarded
as permitting the use of such affidavits in situations where
they would not otherwise be proper. (Of. People v. Evans,
39 Cal.2d 242, 250 [246 P.2d 636] [rejecting a similar argument made with respect to Pen. Code. § 1181, subd. 2].) The
statements to the contrary in Shipley v. Permanente II ospital,
127 Cal.App.2d 417, 424 [274 P.2d 53, 48 A.L.R2d 964], are
disapproved.
A few jurisdictions permit a wider use of a juror's affidavit to impeach a verdict than has been allowed in California (see Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Tel. Go., 20 Iowa
195, 210-212; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150
[ 13 S. Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917] ) , and plaintiffs urge us to relax
the rule in this state. The problem involves the balancing
of two eonfiieting policies. It is, of eourse, neeessary to prevent instability of verdicts, fraud, and harassment of jurors,
and, on the other hand, it is desirable to give the losing
party relief from wrongful conduet by the jury. The eourt
in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-269 [35 S.Ct. 783,
59 L.Ed. 1300], after discussing these polieies and stating
that the wrong to the individual vvas the lesser of two evils,
2

Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:
''The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified
or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all
or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any
of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such
party:
'' 1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party
was prevented from having a fair trial;
'' 2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the
jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or
to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort
to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors; . . . "
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concluded that as a general rule the affidavits should be
excluded but that there might be instances where the rule
could not be applied without" violating the plainest principles
of justice.''
[ 4b] In California, as we have seen, only two exceptions
have been recognized, one by statute and one by judicial
decision. [6] The present case does not come within either of
them, and, whether or not additional exceptions may be
justified under some circumstances, we are of the view that
the allegations of the affidavit before us, even if taken as true,
do not warrant a departure from the general rule. It is
doubtful whether the conduct of the bailiff and the foreman's
action at the' time of completing the verdicts would have
caused persons of ordinary intelligence to acquiesce in verdicts which did not represent their conclusions, and when
the jurors were polled in open court all of them except the
three affiants who voted for plaintiff affirmed each of the verdicts as written. With respect to the foreman's visit to the
scene of the accident and his report to the jury it is difficult
to see how, in the light of the evidence relating to the collision, the duration of the traffic signals could have had a
significant bearing on the outcome of the case.
The judgment is reversed as to Mrs. Abrahamson and
affirmed as to the other plaintiffs.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb,
J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! agree with
the reasons given by the majority for reversing the judgment
against Mrs. Abrahamson, but I can no longer assent to the
dogma, so long parroted, that a juror's affidavit cannot be
used to impeach his verdict.
The common formula that "a juror's testimony or affidavit
is not receivable to impeach his own verdict is not correct
as a statement of existing law, nor is it maintainable on any
principle in this unqualified form." "It is a mere shibboleth
and has no intrinsic signification whatever." (8 Wigmore
on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345, p. 663.)
Notwithstanding Wigmore's acute analysis disapproving the
form in which the rule exists and the automatic application
of it by the courts (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, §§ 2345-2356), the practice in both aspects, unfortunately, remains unchanged. This persistence may, per-
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haps, be attributed to the one great difficulty with a rule
that may be stated clearly and simply. When such a rule
is completed and rounded, the corners smoothed and the content cohesive and coherent, it is likely to become a thing in
itself, a work of art. It is then like a finely engineered bridge
or a completed painting. One hates to disturb it. Even if
knowledge and experience should demonstrate its obsolescence,
one hates to tear it down because it has existed so long in its
original design. I resist any such temptation aud approach
to the law.
The rule that a juror may not impeach his verdict is
founded on three independent and general principles: (1)
Privileged communications; ( 2) parol evidence rule; and ( 3)
self-stultifying testimony. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345.)
The application of the principle of privileged communications between jurors is to insure the attainment of the jurors'
constitutional purposes. It prohibits the disclosure of communications with a fellow juror upon the witness stand
without the latter's consent. However, this principle is generally not significant primarily because what is said between
jurors is seldom relevant at a new trial. (8 Wigmore on
Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2346.) Moreover,
what is disclosed in the affidavit herein is not in the nature
of a communication.
As for the doctrine of self-stultifying testimony, this principle forbids a juror from showing that a juror's behavior was
not in the prescribed form which is necessary before a juror's
actions may be valid. ( 8 \Vigmore on Evidence, Privileged
Communications, § 2345.) It is based on the principle "nemo
turpitudinem suam allegans audietur" (a witness shall not
be heard to allege his own turpitude). (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345.) Wigmore convincingly establishes that this principle no longer exists in our
law and should not be resurrected for present purposes. ( 8
Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, §§ 23522353.)
Therefore, the only principle on which we may validly reject
the affidavits of the jurors herein is by the application of the
parol evidence rule. This principle applies to the verdict of a
jury like a will or a contract or a judgment.
Applying this principle it is evident that a juror's motives,
beliefs, misunderstandings, intentions, and the like are immateriaL The verdict is the sole embodiment of the juror's acts.
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''The policy which requires this is the same which forbids a
consideration of the negotiations of parties to a contract leadup to the final terms as deliberately embodied in the deed,
namely, the loss of all certainty in the verdict, the impracticability of
for definiteness in the preliminary views, the
risk of
after disclosure of the verdict, and
the impossibility of expecting any end to trials if the grounds
for the verdict were allowed to effect its overthrow." ( 8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications,§ 2349, p. 668.)
This rule and policy is followed in California. (Amsby v.
Dickhouse, 4 CaL 102, 103; People v. Wyman, 15 CaL 70, 75;
People v. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257, 258, 263; see People v. Reid, 195
CaL 249 [232 P. 457, 36 A.LR. 1435] .) Accordingly the
statements by the jurors in their affidavits that the foreman
told them that they would have to abide by the verdicts completed by him or they would never again be allowed to act as
jurors are immaterial and may properly be excluded.
However, the policy of the parol evidence rule prohibiting
the disclosure of a juror's motives, beliefs, misunderstandings,
et cetera, does not compel a similar conclusion with respect to
disclosure of irregularities and misconduct of jurors during
their deliberations which constitute deviations from those certain formalities that are regarded as desirable policy-wise in
the conduct of jury deliberations. The law of verdicts "must
prescribe requisite formalities of conduct for the jurors, and
define those informalities and irregularities which 'per se'
invalidate the verdict. What those shall be is thus elsewhere
in the law predetermined. The principle of the Parol Evidence rule then enters and declares that the lack of such formalities, for this as for every other legal act (whatever the
respective required formality may be), is always proper to
establish as a ground for declaring the act void. Whatever
misconduct of the jury, therefore, is an irregularity fatal to
the verdict may always be proved.'' ( 8 Wigmore on Evidence,
Privileged Communications, § 2352, p. 683.)
Admittedly the distinction between motive and irregularity
may sometimes be shadowy and difficult to perceive, but this
offers no excuse for not attempting to remove the cloud of
uncertainty. Moreover, it is readily apparent that a court
by merely pronouncing the "shibboleth that a juror cannot impeach his verdict can never appreciate the vital distinction
between impeaching" it by motive and impeaching it by irregular conduct. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2349.)
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opl.niCin leaves one in doubt as to what end is
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to grow because of
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In view of the
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of
the majority avoids the very
the court should decide,
i. e., do the affidavits
and misconduct which
constitute deviations from those formalities that are regarded
as desirable in jury deliberations Y· This is a
that has been left to the courts to work out case
Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 1.) After due cortsid.er~ttl
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in the affidavits
do not state a deviation from the desired formalities, but such
a conclusion should only be reached after careful thought.
The court should reconsider the matter clearly
forth
its reasons. This can only be
by
the
automatic formula that a juror's
or affidavit not
receivable to impeach his own verdict.
I think the affidavits in the instant ease are sufficient to
establish misconduct of a character justifying the impeachment of the verdict and that a new trial should be granted as
to all parties and all issues.
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